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Dimensions of Credit Risk and
Their Relationship to Economic
Capital Requirements
Mark Carey
Regulators are now developing a major revision of commercial bank capi-
tal adequacy regulations. Regulators are likely to change the treatment of
a variety of types of risk, but a primary focus of their eﬀort is improvement
of the manner in which the 1988 Basel Accord handles credit risk. Cur-
rently, assets making vastly diﬀerent contributions to portfolio credit risk
often receive similar regulatory capital treatment. Because equity is an
expensive source of ﬁnance, the resulting wedges between regulatory and
economic capital allocations have created strong incentives for banks to
restructure their activities and balance sheets. For example, many bank-
sponsored securitizations are directed at removing from the balance sheet
those assets that have relatively high marginal regulatory capital require-
ments but that contribute relatively little to portfolio credit risk, such as
credit card loans and loans to low-risk corporate borrowers (such activity
is often called capital arbitrage). In contrast, assets for which regulatory
capital requirements are too low tend to remain on the balance sheet. By
boosting capital ratios, the 1988 Accord reduced bank insolvency risk in
the years immediately after its adoption, but if current trends continue to
their logical conclusion, an unmodiﬁed accord could in the end have the
perverse eﬀect of greatly increasing banks’ portfolio risk postures and
bank failure rates. Moreover, any revision of the Accord that preserves
1971. Economic capital requirements for credit risk means the capital needed for a portfolio
so that the chance that credit losses exceed capital is no more than a speciﬁed small probabil-
ity. In many circumstances, economic capital would be the same as that needed to ﬁnance
an asset or portfolio in a free market transaction with informed counterparties.
2. All three approaches must specify required capital for risks other than credit, such as
interest rate risk or operational risk. Although the full models approach has many desirable
properties, practical barriers to its implementation are such that the Basel Supervisors Com-
mittee is focusing its attention on the standardized and internal rating approaches for pos-
sible near-term implementation.
ﬁrst-order diﬀerences between regulatory and economic capital require-
ments probably will be unsustainable in the long run.1
In a recent paper, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999)
brieﬂy outlined three approaches to capital regulation: (a) a revised stan-
dardized approach architecturally similar to the current accord that would
leave in place many distortions; (b) a full models approach, similar to that
now available for market risk, in which a bank’s internal models would
compute required regulatory capital for credit risk; and (c) an internal rat-
ings approach in which credit risk capital would be computed using formu-
las involving various relevant portfolio characteristics, such as the fraction
of loans assigned each internal rating. Both of the latter two approaches
would attempt to make regulatory capital approximate economic capital,
but in the internal ratings approach the parameters and architecture of the
system would be set by regulators, whereas in the full models approach
they would be set by banks and reviewed by regulators.2
A principal barrier to adoption of the full models and internal rating
approaches is technical uncertainty about the portfolio characteristics that
drive credit risk. At least initially, simpler formulas and models are pre-
ferred for their lower costs of implementation. However, to avoid a contin-
uation of serious distortions, regulations must take into account all ﬁrst-
order important determinants of portfolio credit risk. The main body of
portfolio theory, which was developed largely for equity portfolios and
which suggests that correlations of individual loan credit losses with sys-
tematic factors are the main determinant of portfolio risk, is of limited use
in identifying such determinants. The ﬂoating-rate loan portfolios typical
of banks have a large credit downside and only modest upside potential,
which causes the credit loss distributions for such portfolios to be skewed
and to have very long bad tails (ﬁg. 6.1). Though loss correlations are
important, factors like individual asset risk, portfolio size, and the behav-
ior of defaulted assets may also be important determinants of debt portfo-
lio bad-tail loss rates.
Empirical uncertainty about the dimensions of credit risk exists among
policy makers because relatively few publicly available studies exist and
because most such studies have used one of the extant credit risk models to
produce evidence. Models like CreditMetrics (Gupton, Finger, and Bhatia












































n3. A similar database available from Standard & Poor’s is also a primary source of parame-
ter values.
4. In this paper, the desirability of prudential regulation of bank capital is taken as given.
mate loss rates at diﬀerent percentiles of the bad tail conditional on portfo-
lio composition. However, model results are quite sensitive to assumptions
about values of parameters that are extremely diﬃcult to observe, test, or
even develop intuition about (Gordy 2000a). It is diﬃcult to know the
reliability of evidence that such models produce about the inﬂuence of a
given portfolio characteristic on bad-tail loss rates and thus on economic
capital requirements.
This paper uses the Monte Carlo resampling method of Carey (1998) to
provide nonparametric empirical evidence about the practical importance
to portfolio bad-tail loss rates of several diﬀerent asset and portfolio char-
acteristics. This bootstrap-like method simulates the likely range of loss
experience of a portfolio manager who randomly selects assets from those
available for investment, while at the same time causing his portfolio to
conform to speciﬁed targets and limits. For example, the method can be
used to compare both average and bad-tail loss rates of portfolios of Baa-
rated debt with those of portfolios of Ba-rated debt. The resampling
method exchanges the large array of assumptions required by existing
parametric models with an assumption that the loss experience in the data-
base from which assets are drawn is representative of the universe of pos-
sible experience. That assumption is false, of course, but it is possible to
test the sensitivity of results to at least some violations of the assumption.
Moreover, the database used in this paper is a principal source of parame-
ter values for existing parametric models (i.e., Moody’sd a t a b a s eo fb o n d
ratings and defaults during 1970–98).3 To the extent that this database
fails to capture the range of likely experience, parametric models may also
produce unrealistic estimates.
Although this paper’s ﬁndings are likely to be useful in parametric credit
risk model design and to private sector risk managers as well as regulators,
for simplicity the discussion is organized by reference to the internal rat-
ings approach to Basel Accord reform.4 To the best of my knowledge, cur-
rent thinking would have such an approach involve (a) an equation or
similar method of allocating capital to individual assets according to their
characteristics, (b) a simple summation of such allocations to arrive at a
portfoliocapitalrequirement,and(c)perhapssomeadjustmentstotheport-
folio requirement to account for variations in portfolio size or other port-
folio characteristics.
Exercises reported below focus on three questions relevant to such an ar-
chitecture: (a) Which asset or portfolio characteristics should be included
as variables or adjustment factors?; (b) what types of behavior or phenom-
200 Mark Careyena should be considered in estimating the parameters of the system?; and
(c) is a linear structure appropriate? That is, does a simple sum of capital
allocations appropriate to homogenous pools of assets approximate well
the capital required for a mixed pool of assets?
Results imply that borrower default ratings, estimates of the likely loss
given default on individual assets (LGD, or one minus the recovery rate),
and measures of portfolio size or granularity are important candidate vari-
ables for the regulatory formula. Default ratings appear most important,
with loss rates at the 99th percentile diﬀering by a factor of about 60 for
borrowers rated A or better relative to those rated B. Predictable diﬀer-
ences in LGDs (e.g., diﬀerences for senior versus subordinated debt) also
c a nh a v eaﬁrst-order impact on required capital. Although increases in
portfolio size beyond a certain point appear to be associated with rela-
tively modest reductions in risk, small portfolios are signiﬁcantly riskier
than larger portfolios, and thus any regulation might need to be parameter-
ized diﬀerently for small and large banks. Moreover, diﬀerences in granu-
larity (i.e., the extent to which a large fraction of portfolio is exposed to
only a few obligors) can have a material eﬀe c to nr i s k .
One natural way of implementing an internal rating–based regulation
would be to estimate the capital required for portfolios composed only of
assets with each permutation of ratings, expected LGD, and so on. Capital
for mixed portfolios would be the sum of the share of the mixed portfolio
in each “bucket” times the estimated requirement for that bucket. An exer-
cise in which capital requirements as computed by such a linear approach
are compared to direct estimates of required capital for a variety of portfo-
lio risk postures yields mixed results, but on the whole implies that the
linear approximation is likely to be adequate.
A potential weakness of the internal ratings approach is that it would
ignore diﬀerences in certain types of diversiﬁcation across portfolios.
Much of the machinery of CreditMetrics, for example, is designed to esti-
mate diﬀerences in credit risk correlations across borrowers as well as the
portfolio risk eﬀects of such diﬀerences. Correlations are often presumed
to be related to the industries and countries in which borrowers operate,
but no consensus about values of such correlations exists. Given the lack
of consensus, practitioners often use credit risk models to ﬁne-tune formal
or informal limits on loans to one industry or loans to one region. Moni-
toring such limits has long been a part of bank examinations in the United
States. However, if bad-tail loss rates are sensitive to modest variations in
the limits, it might be necessary to build such variations into the regulatory
formula—ad i ﬃcult task. Fortunately, resampling exercises that vary the
loan-to-one-industry limit for a few diﬀerent sets of industry deﬁnitions
yield modest diﬀerences in bad-tail loss rates. Data limitations complicate
resampling analysis of diversiﬁcation across countries, which intuition sug-
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a country. See Jackson and Perraudin (1999) and Nickell, Perraudin, and
Varotto (1998) for some insights about country eﬀects, and Flannery
(1989) for an analysis of incentive eﬀects of capital regulation on port-
folio choices.
In estimating the parameters of a formula based on internal ratings,
policy makers and technicians should be attentive to implications of the
unpredictability of individual LGDs, to the deﬁnition of default, and to
the fact that capital set to limit bank failure rates in a hypothetical average
year may be much less than needed in bad years. For example, many credit
risk models appeal to the law of large numbers in assuming that assets that
are similarly senior (e.g., having similar collateral) will have similar LGDs
if a default occurs. However, LGDs can vary signiﬁcantly across otherwise
similar assets, and the risk that a bank will be unlucky with respect to
both the number of defaults and their severity can be material, even if
LGD rates and default rates are assumed to be uncorrelated.
On the whole, this paper’s results indicate that if the internal ratings
approach properly accounts for all the ﬁrst-order important dimensions of
credit risk, it is likely to produce regulatory capital allocations for credit
risk that are reasonable approximations to economic capital allocations.
However, factors in addition to those considered in this paper are also
likely to be important determinants of portfolio risk, so more research is
needed before ﬁnal conclusions are reached. For example, this paper fo-
cuses only on losses associated with defaults and distressed restructurings
and thus is most consistent with a “default mode” or standard accounting
view of credit risk. However, in a mark-to-market view, both variations in
borrower credit quality short of default and variations in open market
credit spreads are important determinants of changes in portfolio market
value. Kiesel, Perraudin, and Taylor (1999) oﬀer evidence that such factors
may be comparable in importance to default risk.
The remaining maturity of assets and the proper horizon over which
portfolio credit risk should be measured are also probably important,
though not analyzed in this paper (see Calem 1999; Jackson and Perraudin
1999; and Kiesel, Perraudin, and Taylor 1999 for some relevant evidence).
Although a one-year analysis horizon is conventional in credit risk model-
ing and is used here, default-mode analyses using such a horizon unrealis-
tically assume that a bank losing almost all its capital in a given year will
either be able to recapitalize at the end of the year or will suﬀer no (or
only small) losses in subsequent years.
More generally, the formal modeling of credit and many other risks re-
mains a new and largely untested art. Using existing risk-modeling tech-
nologies to engineer regulatory capital requirements to very ﬁne tolerances
would amplify model risk—that is, the chance that unforeseen circum-
stances will produce losses larger than required capital. However, if regula-
202 Mark Carey5. See Vojta (1973) for an early analysis of the appropriate level and structure of capital re-
quirements.
tory requirements are to include substantial margins for model risk, mar-
ket participants must be persuaded of the need for such margins, or a
continuation of capital arbitrage will simply render regulatory require-
ments ineﬀective.
This paper’s results are not meant to be estimates of the levels of capital
requirements for credit risk that regulators should require for any given
portfolio, but rather to be indicators of likely proportional diﬀerences in
levels as asset and portfolio characteristics vary. The appropriate level is
sensitive to a variety of assumptions, including the degree of systemic and
deposit-insurer risk that regulators are willing to tolerate, and is a matter
beyond the scope of this paper.5
To the extent that a reader does wish to take this paper’s estimates as
preliminary indicators of levels of economic capital requirements for credit
risk alone, it is important to note that the most appropriate point of com-
parison in the current accord is the 4 percent Tier 1 leverage ratio. Al-
though the bad-tail loss rates reported herein combine expected and un-
expected losses, borrowers rated riskier than B3 are omitted from the
exercises, and at least in the United States much of the loan loss reserve is
allocated to losses associated with such borrowers. Thus, the bad-tail
losses reported in the tables conform most closely to those that equity
capital would absorb in the United States.
As noted, regulatory applications are emphasized in this paper’s discus-
sion, but the results are relevant for credit risk managers at banks and
other ﬁnancial institutions and to sponsors of collateralized debt obliga-
tions (CDOs). All such institutions make simultaneous decisions about
portfolio risk, capital structure, and remaining risk to be borne by their
residual claimants, and knowledge of the determinants of debt portfolio
credit risk is helpful to such decision making.
Section 6.1 describes the data, and section 6.2 describes some details of
the resampling method. Sections 6.3 through 6.9 report results, and section
6.10 oﬀers concluding comments.
6.1 Data
Information about corporate bonds rated by Moody’s, including the rat-
ings of bonds and issuers, the identity and timing of defaults, and some
other characteristics, is obtained for the years 1970–98 from the April 1999
release of Moody’s Corporate Bond Default Database. The database is a
complete history of Moody’s long-term rating assignments for both U.S.
and non-U.S. ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms and sovereigns (no commer-
cial paper ratings, municipal bond ratings, or ratings of asset-backed secu-
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would be muddied by use of bond-level rating data. Moody’s considers both the quality of
the issuer and the terms of the indenture in rating a bond, especially terms like collateral,
guarantees, or subordination provisions. In contrast, variations in issuer ratings across bor-
rowers are more likely to be indicative of diﬀerences in the probability of issuer default be-
cause such ratings are uniformly for a senior unsecured claim.
7. Carty (1996) examined rating withdrawals and found almost all to be associated with
maturities and calls of bonds, not with an imminent default. Moreover, the database tracks
defaults even if they occur after Moody’s withdrew ratings.
rities are included). In addition to the ratings of individual bonds, Moody’s
provides a table of issuer ratings—that is, the actual or likely rating on a
senior unsecured bond for each issuer for each date the issuer had any
rated bonds outstanding. All analysis is done at the issuer level and is
restricted to U.S. issuers (the number of non-U.S. issuers became material
only in recent years.)6
A loss experience record is constructed for each issuer and year in which
the issuer was rated at the start of the year. Those cases in which the issuer
defaulted during the year are exposed-and-defaulting records, whereas
those in which no default occurred are counted as exposed but not de-
faulting. Similar to the methods of Moody’s annual study of default rates
by grade, the rate for any year and grade is the number of defaults divided
by the total number of exposures. Cases in which an issuer’sr a t i n gi sw i t h -
drawn during the experience year are counted as half a unit of exposure
unless the issuer defaults.7
In this paper, each exposure-year record is treated as representing all
exposures to the borrower. Although a given borrower may have many
loans outstanding at a given bank, in the United States a borrower rarely
defaults on some but not all obligations. Thus, it is conventional in credit
risk analysis to aggregate all loans to a borrower into a single exposure.
Loan sizes are simulated according to the rules and purposes of each exer-
cise, as is described later.
Moody’s assigns one of about 200 industry codes to each borrower.
Some of the codes correspond well to conventional deﬁnitions of industries
(e.g., “Airlines”) but some are quite narrowly focused (e.g., “Hospital sup-
plies” vs. “Hospitals/nursing”). In monitoring their exposure to individual
industries and in imposing limits on such exposure, most large banks use
internally developed industry classiﬁcations involving a few dozen catego-
ries. To simulate such procedures, I judgmentally created two separate
classiﬁcation schemes that boil down Moody’s 200 categories into 20 and
39 categories, respectively.
Moody’s database contains some (but not complete) information on the
LGDs of defaulted bonds. Because every study to date has found substan-
tial diﬀerences between the LGD experience of loans and bonds (e.g., So-
ciety of Actuaries 1998; Asarnow and Edwards 1995; and Hamilton and
Carty 1999), the bond LGDs are not used in this paper. Instead, LGDs
204 Mark Carey8. For example, if the loss rate at the 99th percentile is 5 percent, then a 5 percent equity
capital ratio will be suﬃcient to prevent insolvency with probability 0.99.
for each default are set or simulated according to the rules of each exercise,
as is described later.
6.2 Some Details of the Resampling Method and Its Implementation
Events in the bad tail of a ﬁnancial intermediary’s portfolio loss distri-
bution can cause insolvency unless the portfolio is ﬁnanced entirely with
equity. If it is ﬁnanced partly with debt, the probability of insolvency can
be reduced to a given level by choosing a capital structure with enough
equity to cover the loss at the percentile of the portfolio loss distribution
equal to that level.8 Estimating how capital ratios must vary to preserve a
given insolvency probability as portfolio characteristics change is a matter
of estimating how the portfolio loss distribution changes.
The resampling method traces out loss distributions nonparametrically.
For each exercise (set of portfolio parameters), 100,000 simulated portfo-
lios are composed by drawing randomly from the loss experience database
until the speciﬁed portfolio size is reached. Draws for any single simulated
portfolio are without replacement. Drawn assets are rejected if they fail to
satisfy the parameters for the given exercise. For example, each exercise
speciﬁes a target percentage of the portfolio to fall in each rating category.
A Baa-rated asset would be rejected for inclusion if suﬃcient assets with
that rating had already been drawn, even if the total simulated portfolio
was not yet ﬁlled. Looking across simulated portfolios, all will have the
same set of speciﬁed characteristics, but some will by chance include many
defaulting assets and others few. Dollar loss rates are computed for each
drawn portfolio, and the frequency distribution of such losses forms an
estimate of the loss distribution for portfolios with the speciﬁed character-
istics. For example, after rank-ordering simulated portfolios by loss rate,
the loss rate for the 99,000th portfolio would be the estimated capital ratio
suﬃcient to present insolvency with probability 0.99 for portfolios speci-
ﬁed in the exercise.
For any given simulated portfolio (iteration), the draw is in two stages:
(a) One of the twenty-nine experience years in the database is drawn, and
(b) individual loans exposed during that year are drawn until the simulated
portfolio is ﬁlled. Using experience from multiple years for a given simu-
lated portfolio would tend to understate tail loss rates because the results
of diﬀerent realizations of systematic economic risk factors would be unre-
alistically combined.
The resampling method’s strength is its lack of assumptions about func-
tional forms of distributions, parameters, and covariances among asset re-
turns. However, when applied to the Moody’s database, the method has
several weaknesses. Most importantly, the period 1970–98, though long by
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range of possible systematic events. For example, the United States did
not experience a depression, and many speciﬁc industries did not experi-
ence severe distress, but both a depression and distress in heretofore un-
troubled industries are possibilities in the future. Thus, all estimates of tail
loss rates are understated in that the eﬀects of very bad systematic events
are not modeled.
In principle, parametric credit risk models can avoid this problem by
specifying parameters that embody suﬃciently pessimistic assumptions
about future events. In practice, however, historical data are used to esti-
mate the parameters of such models, and the Moody’s and Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) databases are principal sources of such data. In general, I
recommend caution in interpreting the levels of tail loss rates estimated by
any available method. In setting levels for capital regulations, policy mak-
ers should ask to see bad-tail loss rate estimates for diﬀerent assumptions
about the frequency and severity of future systematic economic events.
A general advantage of the resampling method is that the eﬀects of real-
istic correlations of losses across individual assets are reﬂected in estimated
bad-tail loss rates because such correlations are embedded in the loss expe-
rience database. However, in applications of the method, the realism of
embedded correlations is limited by the features of the database being
used. Major advantages of the Society of Actuaries database used in Carey
(1998) are its focus on private debt instruments and its incorporation of
actual LGDs for each credit risk event, so that both cross-default and
default LGD correlations typical of loans are captured. However, that da-
tabase covers a relatively short time period (1986–92) and lacks informa-
tion about the industries of many borrowers, limiting both the range of
correlations reﬂected in the data and the ability to study the eﬀect of indus-
try diversiﬁcation on bad-tail loss rates. The Moody’s database is in many
respects a mirror image. It covers a relatively long time period and has
complete information about borrower industries, but it covers only public
debt issuers and has LGD information that is not very useful for the pur-
poses of this paper. Fortunately, for exercises that are qualitatively similar
here and in Carey (1998), results are usually qualitatively similar.
Because the Moody’s data are at the issuer level and bond LGDs diﬀer
so much from those for loans, it is necessary to assign both loan sizes and
(for defaults) LGDs to each observation rather than using values drawn
from the data. To some extent, such generated data are a necessity because
studying the eﬀects of variations in portfolio granularity and LGD proper-
ties involves perturbing those characteristics. However, to make the base-
case data as realistic as possible, both loan sizes and LGDs are assigned
randomly such that the distribution of their values closely matches distri-
butions that are realistic for private debt portfolios. Except as otherwise
noted, the simulated distribution of individual LGDs matches closely the
206 Mark Carey9. LGDs are assumed uncorrelated with default rates (e.g., simulated LGDs are not sys-
tematically diﬀerent for defaults in recession and nonrecession years). This assumption of
independence is common in the credit risk modeling literature, and is not inconsistent with
the limited available empirical evidence, but studies identifying the degree of any correlation
are needed.
distribution reported in Society of Actuaries (1998).9 Except where ﬁxed
identical loan sizes are simulated, loan sizes are set as fractions of total
simulated portfolio dollar value to match the distribution of fractions for
an actual large U.S. bank. In most simulations reported here, about 40
percent of total dollar exposure is associated with the largest 10 percent
of individual exposures. Such skewness of sizes is not atypical: I have in-
spected loan size distributions for a variety of large ﬁnancial institutions,
and they typically involve a signiﬁcant concentration of assets.
The resampling method is data intensive in that it requires that the data-
base have considerably more loss experience records with a given set of
characteristics than are required to populate any given drawn portfolio.
For example, if a portfolio of 500 Ba-rated loans is to be simulated and
there are only 500 Ba-rated loans in the database for each year, the esti-
mated loss distribution will collapse to the overall average loss rate because
all the loans will be drawn for each iteration. Experiments indicate that
numbers of observations in database cells must be at least ﬁve or six times
larger than numbers in simulated portfolio cells. The Moody’s database
does not satisfy this requirement for virtually all of the exercises reported
in this paper.
I address the problem by replicating the base data for each grade a
suﬃcient number of times. For example, to ensure that there are enough
Baa loans in every year, for most exercises I create a single replica of each
Baa loss experience record in each year. Replicas are identical to base
records except that a diﬀerent borrower ID number is assigned, a diﬀerent
loan dollar size is assigned (as was described previously), and—if it is a
default—ad i ﬀerent LGD is assigned (as was described previously). For
any given exercise, the replication factors are held constant across the
diﬀerent permutations of the exercise.
Such replication represents an intermediate case between sampling from
the data with replacement and without replacement. It may seem problem-
atic in that with replication the same defaulting borrower can be drawn
twice into the same portfolio, but such a view is not quite correct. In the
exercises of this paper, borrower identity is unimportant: Each observation
is an exposure to a diﬀerent simulated borrower, and each borrower is
simply a bundle of rating, industry, and default/nondefault characteristics.
Replication preserves exactly the proportions of defaulting and nonde-
faulting borrowers in each grade and industry in each year, as well as the
fraction of exposures in each industry.
Diﬀerent degrees of replication may, however, aﬀect the levels of esti-
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c a nb et h o u g h to fa sa ﬀecting the cross-default correlations embedded in
the data. To see the eﬀect, imagine that in Moody’s database only two
borrowers defaulted in a given grade and year. When simulating a portfolio
of 100 loans by drawing without replacement, the maximum estimated
default rate for that grade and year is 2 percent—the bad tail is truncated
beyond that point because if both borrowers happen to be drawn in build-
ing a given simulated portfolio, it is certain that remaining loans drawn
into the portfolio will be nondefaulters. This seems unrealistic—there are
always more bad loans to be made—and thus drawing without replace-
ment from any actual database seems likely to understate true bad-tail loss
rates. That is, as was noted previously, the correlations embedded in any
actual ﬁnite database, because they represent only a portion of the possible
range of experience, seem likely to understate the true correlations. Going
to the other extreme, if draws are with replacement, it is always possible
to draw another simulated default into a simulated portfolio, and indeed
the likelihood of doing so is unaﬀected by the outcome of any previous
draws. This also seems a bit unrealistic. The method most likely to deliver
accurate estimates of the levels of bad-tail loss rates—with or without
replacement, or with some intermediate method implemented by some de-
gree of replication—is a question for future research. For the purposes of
this paper, however, results of interest are qualitatively insensitive to the
degree of replication that is applied.
6.3 Results for a Base Case
Table 6.1 presents the parameters of the base case. Subsequent exercises
vary one of the parameters while holding the others constant at base-case
values unless otherwise noted. The base portfolio has $5 billion of com-
mercial loans with sizes that vary in a manner similar to that of an actual
large bank, as was described previously. The number of loans in the portfo-
l i oi sn o tﬁxed, but the parameterization of the loan size distribution keeps
the number close to 500. In a few exercises I ﬁx the number of loans and
let the portfolio dollar total ﬂoat, but that requires enforcement of loan-
to-one-borrower and loan-to-one-industry limits in terms of fractions of
the number of loans rather than fractions of the dollar total, which is unin-
tuitive. Results are qualitatively similar regardless of whether numbers or
dollars are ﬁxed.
The loan-to-one-borrower limit is set at 3 percent of portfolio dollar
size, whereas the loan-to-one-industry limit is 5 percent of portfolio size
and is implemented using the judgmentally developed thirty-nine-industry
classiﬁcation scheme described previously. All loans are presumed to be
senior; only actual defaults appearing in the database are treated as credit
risk events; and the LGDs for those defaults are generated such that their
208 Mark Carey10. For readers accustomed to unexpected loss rates, those would simply be the loss rates
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distribution matches the distribution for senior loan default LGDs in Soci-
ety of Actuaries (1998). The distribution of portfolio dollars across ratings
conforms to the average distribution for large U.S. banks reported in
Treacy and Carey (1998).
The ﬁrst row of table 6.2 reports results for the base case. The mean or
expected loss rate is 0.63 percent, whereas loss rates at the 95th, 99th,
99.5th, and 99.9th percentiles of the distribution are 1.87, 2.71, 3.04, and
3.87 percent, respectively.10 Clearly, loss rates rise signiﬁcantly with the
percentile, implying, for example, that considerably more capital is re-
quired to prevent insolvency in 999 of 1,000 portfolio-years than in 950 of
1,000 experience-years. The mean loss rate of 0.63 percent is less than the
1 percent of the long-run average commercial and industrial (C&I) loan
charge-oﬀ rate for U.S. banks. However, as noted, issuers rated riskier than
B3 are omitted from the exercises, and the set of credit events includes
defaults but no negotiated restructurings. Loans to issuers riskier than B3
would generally be considered classiﬁed assets on U.S. bank balance
sheets. A signiﬁcant share of real-world average or expected losses is asso-
Table 6.1 Parameters of Base Case
Parameter Value Comment
Experience years included 1970–98 Equally weighted
Portfolio size criterion Dollar limit of $5 billion
Loan sizes Mimic actual bank distribution Mean is near $10 million
Number of portfolio loans Floats But close to 500
Loan to one borrower limit 3 percent of portfolio size
Industry classiﬁcation type Carey 39 industries
Loan to one industry limit 5 percent of portfolio size
Fraction loans senior 100%
Included credit events Only actual defaults
LGD speciﬁcation Mimic Society of Actuaries Mean is 37 percent
(1998) distribution for senior
loans
Fraction Fractions are representative of
rated A or better 20% the average of large U.S.
rated Baa 30% banks (close to mean
rated Ba 35% shares of dollar
rated B 15% outstandings reported in
Treacy and Carey 1998).
Replications of each grade A  2, Baa  3, Ba  5,
B  15
No. of iterations 100,000
Note: Simulated portfolios and resampling exercises have the characteristics described in this table for
the base case, and for all other cases unless otherwise noted.
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99.9th percentile is close to the 4 percent Tier 1 capital ratio of the current Basel Accord.
ciated with such loans and with negotiated restructurings, so their inclu-
sion in simulations would move the mean estimated loss rate much closer
to 1 percent.11
The second, third, and fourth rows of table 6.2 show that results are
little aﬀected when the replication factor for each grade is doubled, set to
thirty for all grades, or set to eighty for all grades, respectively. Estimated
loss rates at the diﬀerent percentiles diﬀer from base values by two to nine
basis points, representing at most a 0.03 percent proportional change in
the base-case loss rate. As was noted previously, although in principle the
appropriate degree of replication is uncertain, in practice results appear
insensitive to variations in the replication factors.
6.4 Results When All Loans Are in One Grade
Table 6.3 presents results for portfolios composed entirely of assets rated
A or better, Baa, Ba, and B, and for comparison results for base-case pa-
rameters when the larger replication factors used in this exercise are ap-
plied. Focusing on the mean and 99th percentile loss rates, both the mean
and bad-tail rates are near zero for assets rated A or better, reﬂecting the
fact that very few issuers with such ratings defaulted over a one-year hori-
zon during the years since 1970. Looking down the grades, the expected
loss rate rises by a factor of about 700 between the A and B categories,
whereas the 99th percentile loss rate rises by a factor of about 60. Tail
rates for the investment grades (Baa and above) are far below that for the
Table 6.2 Average and Bad-Tail Loss Rates for Base Case
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case 0.63 1.87 2.71 3.04 3.87
Base case, replication factor doubled 0.63 1.89 2.77 3.13 3.94
Base case, replication factor  30
for all grades 0.63 1.85 2.71 3.09 3.85
Base case, replication factor  80
for all grades 0.63 1.88 2.74 3.11 3.88
Notes: The ﬁrst row reports loss rates for the base case, the parameters of which are given in
table 6.1. Results in remaining rows are for the same parameters except that the number of
replications of loans in each year and grade is increased. Loss rates at high percentiles are
total loss rates; unexpected loss rates at such percentiles are the total rate less the mean or
expected rate as reported.
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investment-grade tail rates are also far below current regulatory capital
requirements, which is evidence of banks’ l a r g ei n c e n t i v e st om o v es u c h
loans oﬀ the balance sheet. B-rated bad-tail loss rates are well above those
of the base case and well above current Tier 1 regulatory requirements,
implying that current regulations do not require enough capital for rela-
tively risky loans. In the absence of regulatory reform, the share of risky
loans in bank portfolios is thus likely to increase.
Overall, it seems clear from the results in table 6.3 that ratings are an
important indicator of a loan’s contribution to bad-tail risk and thus of
marginal economic capital requirements. Readers accustomed to the ﬁnd-
ings of standard portfolio theory may ﬁnd this an uncomfortable result
(that indicators of stand-alone asset risk or volatility are highly correlated
with portfolio returns). As was noted previously, models that account for
the diﬀerences between debt and equity imply such a relationship (see
Zhou 1997 for an example). Moreover, ratings may also be indicators of
the degree of correlation of default risk with systematic economic factors
such as the business cycle. In descriptions of their methodologies, the rat-
ing agencies state that ﬁrms in cyclically volatile industries are more likely
to be assigned riskier ratings, other things being equal.
6.5 Seniority Is Important
Although LGDs vary widely across individual defaults and restructur-
ings, with senior secured credit events sometimes imposing a total loss and
junior subordinated credit events sometimes imposing no loss, on average
the values of LGDs diﬀer with the priority of the debt and the nature of
the credit event. For bank loans, which are generally senior or secured,
Table 6.3 Loss Rates for Portfolios with All Loans in a Single Grade
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case 0.63 1.88 2.74 3.11 3.88
All loans rated A or better 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.67
All loans rated Baa 0.06 0.42 0.98 1.20 1.81
All loans rated Ba 0.53 1.95 2.96 3.36 4.19
All loans rated B 2.85 6.29 8.12 8.76 9.88
Notes:For comparison with remaining rows, the ﬁrst row reports results for base-case param-
eters except that a replication factor of 80 is applied to loans in all grades and years. Re-
maining rows report results when simulated portfolios are constrained to contain loans only
to borrowers with the speciﬁed start-of-year rating, with other parameters identiﬁed to those
of the base case apart from the replication factor of 80.
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bank loans to bankrupt ﬁrms is 21 percent, whereas it is 13 percent for
secured loans. Carty and Lieberman (1996) also report statistics implying
that collateral on average is associated with a 10 percentage point diﬀer-
ence in LGDs. Asarnow and Edwards (1995) ﬁnd a 35 percent LGD for
C&I loans without distinguishing priority. For bonds, Altman, Waldman,
and Kane (1996) ﬁnd mean LGDs of about 50 percent for senior-secured,
about 60 percent for senior-unsecured, and roughly 80 percent for subordi-
nated debt. For private placements, Society of Actuaries (1998) reports
mean LGDs of 20 and 44 percent for restructurings and defaults, respec-
tively, and an approximately 15 percentage point diﬀerence between the
mean LGDs of senior and subordinated defaults. The broad range of val-
ues found by the diﬀerent studies reﬂects not only diﬀerent types of debt
and diﬀerent samples but also diﬀerent methods of measurement.
Priority diﬀers across instruments in bank portfolios, raising the possi-
bility of predictable diﬀerences in both average and bad-tail loss rates
across portfolios. To obtain evidence about the importance of seniority-
related asset characteristics to capital allocations, I vary the proportion of
simulated portfolio assets that are subordinated, using two sets of LGD
assumptions. Table 6.4 reports results when the percentage of subordi-
nated loans in simulated portfolios varies between 0 and 80 percent and
when LGDs for individual credit events have simulated values that mimic
the event-type and seniority-speciﬁc distributions in Society of Actuaries
(1998; means are 44 and 63 percent for senior and subordinated defaults,
and 22 and 24 percent for senior and subordinated restructurings). Simu-
lated restructurings are added in proportion to the defaults already in the
data, as is described in more detail in section 6.9.1. Here the only role of
Table 6.4 Loss Rates as the Fraction of Subordinated Loans Varies,
Variable LGDs
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Restructurings included, 0% subordinated 0.80 2.25 3.18 3.54 4.32
Restructurings included, 20% subordinated 0.85 2.34 3.28 3.68 4.47
Restructurings included, 40% subordinated 0.91 2.55 3.59 3.99 4.82
Restructurings included, 60% subordinated 0.96 2.70 3.80 4.23 5.20
Restructurings included, 80% subordinated 1.01 2.85 4.03 4.46 5.39
Notes: In the exercises reported in this table, LGDs are permitted to vary randomly across
individual credit events in a manner mimicking event-type and seniority-speciﬁc distribu-
tions from Society of Actuaries (1998). Mean LGDs for senior and subordinated defaults
are 44 and 63 percent, respectively, and for senior and subordinated restructurings are 22
and 24 percent, respectively. Other parameters for the exercise are those of the base case.
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Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Restructurings included, 0% subordinated 0.18 0.48 0.64 0.71 0.84
Restructurings included, 20% subordinated 0.31 0.88 1.31 1.50 1.87
Restructurings included, 40% subordinated 0.45 1.26 1.83 2.04 2.50
Restructurings included, 60% subordinated 0.58 1.64 2.28 2.52 3.09
Restructurings included, 80% subordinated 0.72 1.97 2.68 2.97 3.54
Notes: In the exercises reported in this table, LGDs are held ﬁxed for each type of credit
event and priority. LGD values for senior and subordinated defaults are 10 and 50 percent,
respectively, and for senior and subordinated restructurings are 5 and 20 percent, respec-
tively. Other parameters for the exercise are those of the base case.
the restructurings is to provide a platform to allow diﬀerences between
LGDs on defaults and restructurings to be material to results. In table 6.4,
both mean and bad-tail loss rates increase by about 20 to 25 percent from
the 0 to 80 percent subordinated case, amounting to about a full percent-
age point diﬀerence in loss rates at the highest reported percentiles.
Table 6.5 shows results for an exercise in which simulated LGDs are set
to identical values for all credit events of a given type and seniority (10
and 50 percent for senior and subordinated defaults, respectively, and 5
and 20 percent for senior and subordinated restructurings). The values
were chosen to demonstrate the eﬀects of larger diﬀerences in asset-type-
related LGDs than are embedded in table 6.4’s exercises. Unsurprisingly,
the eﬀect of varying the subordinated fraction is larger, with loss rates at
the 99th percentile increasing by a factor of four.
If the evidence from Carty and colleagues (1998) that collateral yields
only about a 10 percentage point improvement in average LGDs reﬂects
reality, and if a secured/unsecured distinction is the only one relevant for
bank loan portfolios, then the diﬀerences in loss rates shown in tables 6.4
and 6.5 overstate somewhat the possible distortions of ignoring seniority
in capital regulations. However, many bankers believe that the type of col-
lateral is as important as the presence of collateral, positing large diﬀer-
ences in expected LGDs across types. Moreover, banking organizations
increasingly are investing in the full range of capital market instruments,
including unsecured junior subordinated debt, for which LGDs are on av-
erage far worse than those of secured loans. Thus, results in tables 6.4
and 6.5 probably understate the importance to capital of variations in the
seniority of portfolio investments. Overall, it appears that a failure to in-
clude in regulatory capital requirements a sensitivity to LGD-related asset
characteristics might be quite distortionary.
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Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case, but 500 loans, random sizes 0.67 2.01 2.98 3.39 4.34
Base case, but 500 loans, equal sizes 0.65 1.73 2.37 2.58 2.98
Base case, but 100 loans, random sizes 0.66 2.78 4.48 5.14 6.55
Base case, but 1,000 loans, random sizes 0.66 1.84 2.72 3.09 4.11
Base case, but 2,000 loans, random sizes 0.66 1.80 2.67 3.10 3.93
Notes: The ﬁrst and third through ﬁfth rows report results for base-case parameters, but
unlike in other tables, simulated portfolios are considered to be complete when they contain
the number of exposures speciﬁed in the Variant column, not when they reach the usual
speciﬁed portfolio dollar size of $5 billion. Portfolio size for the ﬁrst row is similar to that of
the usual base case. Portfolio size is varied in the third through ﬁfth rows. In the second row,
portfolio size is ﬁxed at 500 loans, but individual loan dollar sizes are ﬁxed at $10 million
each, whereas in other rows the distribution of loan dollar size relative to the approximately
$5 billion portfolio size mimics that of an actual large U.S. bank.
6.6 Portfolio Granularity Is Important
Standard portfolio theory, as applied to equity portfolios, implies that
portfolio risk becomes almost insensitive to portfolio size beyond a rather
modest number of assets. However, as was noted previously, debt portfo-
lios are much harder to diversify than are equity portfolios. Moreover, ac-
tual banks’ loan portfolios tend to contain some loans that are rather large
in dollar amount relative to the portfolio dollar size. Intuition suggests that
for such portfolios the performance of a relative handful of loans can have
a material eﬀe c to nl o s sr a t e s .
Full-scale credit risk models, such as CreditMetrics, handle variations
in portfolio granularity naturally because individual exposure sizes enter
the calculations, but diﬀerences in granularity are a bit more problematic
for the internal-ratings approach to capital regulation. That approach
would place assets with similar ratings, expected LGDs, and so on into
groups or buckets, with an implicit presumption that each bucket contains
a large number of relatively small loans. However, it seems likely that an in-
ternalratingsapproach couldapproximatetheeﬀectsof diﬀerencesinport-
folio granularity across banks by applying a granularity adjustment factor
to each bucket (see Gordy 2000b for an example).
Table 6.6 displays eﬀects of varying both the number of loans in simu-
lated portfolios and the distribution of loan sizes. For these exercises, the
size of each simulated portfolio is controlled such that the number of loans
is the same for each while the dollar totals vary somewhat around target
amounts. Loan-to-one-industry and loan-to-one-borrower limits are en-
forced in terms of the number of assets and also are roughly enforced in
terms of fractions of portfolio dollar amounts.
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pected losses. They only inﬂuence bad-tail loss rates. A practical interpretation of this regu-
larity is that a bank with a concentrated portfolio can experience no problems for many
years, but a surprise can more easily be fatal than for a bank with a ﬁne-grained portfolio.
The ﬁrst row shows results for parameters similar to those of the usual
base case, which features a distribution of loan sizes typical of an actual
large bank, whereas the second row shows results when each of the 500
portfolio loans are the same dollar size. Equalizing loan sizes reduces the
99th percentile loss rate by about 20 percent, implying that diﬀerences in
granularity across banks may have signiﬁcant implications for the eco-
nomic capital they require for credit risk.
The third through ﬁfth rows of table 6.6 feature the usual random loan
sizes but diﬀerent numbers of loans. When the number is reduced to 100
loans, bad-tail loss rates increase by 50 percent relative to those in the ﬁrst
row. When the number is increased to 1,000 or 2,000 loans, bad-tail rates
are modestly smaller than those in the ﬁr s tr o w ,b ya sm u c ha s1 0p e r c e n t
or so. These results suggest that although diﬀerences in numbers of loans
across very large banks may not have much impact on portfolio credit
risk, diﬀerences in size distributions might. Moreover, if an internal ratings
approach to regulatory capital is to be applied to small banks as well as
large banks, some adjustment of capital requirements for their much
smaller portfolios probably is appropriate.12
Loan-to-one-borrower size limits are written into formal U.S. bank reg-
ulations, and internal limits that are tighter than those of the regulation
are part of the policies of every major U.S. bank. Table 6.7 provides some
additional insight into the eﬀects of variations in portfolio granularity by
varying the tightness of the loan-to-one-borrower limit that is routinely
imposed as part of this paper’s exercises. The third row has results for the
3 percent limit that is standard in this paper. Looking up the rows, a 5
Table 6.7 Loss Rates for Diﬀerent Loan-to-One-Borrower Limits
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case, no one-borrower limit 0.66 2.09 3.38 4.16 7.81
Base case, 5 percent one-borrower limit 0.66 2.11 3.14 3.55 4.43
Base case, 3 percent one-borrower limit 0.66 2.11 3.14 3.53 4.44
Base case, 2 percent one-borrower limit 0.66 2.03 2.97 3.34 4.10
Base case, 1 percent one-borrower limit 0.66 1.97 2.81 3.13 3.75
Base case, 0.5 percent one-borrower limit 0.65 1.89 2.64 2.89 3.37
Note: Parameters are those of the base case, except that the loan-to-one-borrower limits
varies as speciﬁed (the limit for the base case is 3 percent).
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ual borrower loss experience covering many years are required for conﬁdent direct measure-
ment of default correlations.
percent limit has essentially no eﬀect. No limit at all also does not change
loss rates except at the 99.9th percentile, where the eﬀect is a huge increase
of more than 3 percentage points. This pattern is reﬂective of the fact that
the portfolio of the actual bank upon which simulated loan sizes are based
has only a few exposures larger than 1 percent of the portfolio, but those
are much larger. Thus, in simulations it is rare that the large loan size is
assigned and doubly rare that it is assigned to a defaulting asset. With no
one-borrower limit at all, huge loans are not screened out of the portfolio;
and even though such loans rarely default, their presence is enough to
have a major impact on the far tail of the portfolio loss distribution.
Looking farther down the table, tighter loan-to-one-borrower limits
have noticeable eﬀects on bad-tail loss rates, especially at the 99.9th per-
centile. The lesson of these results is that loans that are large relative to
portfolio size have a material eﬀect on portfolio risk and economic capital
requirements. For banks that use sophisticated credit risk models in mak-
ing operating decisions, a very tight loan-to-one-borrower limit may not
be needed, as such banks are likely to allocate more capital against very
large loans than against smaller loans and to adjust loan pricing accord-
ingly. However, other banks might be well served by very tight internal
loan-to-one-borrower limits, regardless of the state of regulations.
6.7 Industry of the Borrower Does Not Appear Crucial
Cross-asset default correlations are a central focus of many credit risk
models. Though such correlations cannot be measured directly with any
conﬁdence with available data, several measurement strategies are em-
ployed by practitioners.13 Some use contingent claim modeling techniques
to extract information from equity price correlations, but perhaps more
common are methods that base estimated correlations on the industry and
country of the borrower plus aggregate information about the performance
of the industries and countries.
Traditional credit risk managers have for generations employed a sim-
pler method of appraising and limiting the impact of correlated exposures
on portfolio risk: They impose limits on the fraction of portfolio exposure
to borrowers in any given industry or country. The limits usually do not
vary by industry and are only somewhat speciﬁct od i ﬀerent regions of the
world, reﬂecting the fact that a long period of untroubled performance by
a given industry or country is no guarantee of an untroubled future.
As a practical matter, a regulatory capital regime cannot include limits
or capital charges speciﬁc to a given industry (and perhaps not to a given
country). In addition to the diﬃculty of estimating the values of such limits
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39-Industry Classiﬁcation
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case, no limit 0.66 2.09 3.11 3.52 4.42
Base case, 20 percent limit 0.66 2.08 3.11 3.52 4.38
Base case, 10 percent limit 0.65 2.02 2.95 3.31 4.15
Base case, 5 percent limit 0.63 1.88 2.75 3.06 3.85
Note: Parameters are those of the base case, but the loan-to-one-industry limit is varied from
its usual value of 5 percent.
or charges, their imposition would be seen politically as a form of
government-enforced credit rationing. Moreover, inclusion of such limits
as part of regulation would be technically challenging because of the lack
of a single industry-coding scheme universally recognized as appropriate
for all portfolios.
However, limits on exposure to any single industry regardless of identity
probably should be a part of supervision, where judgment can be applied
in evaluating industry groupings. Such limits have been a part of banking
supervision in the United States for many years in that examiners criticize
banks for having portfolios that they believe are too concentrated. How-
ever, to my knowledge examiners base their reviews on intuition and a
sense of standard industry practice. Also, to my knowledge no empirical
evidence about the implications for bad-tail loss rates of diﬀerent industry
limits has appeared.
Analysis of industry limits is not entirely mechanical in that it is possible
that the details of the industry classiﬁcation scheme might aﬀect results.
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present evidence for diﬀerent limits using the 39-
industry and 20-industry schemes described previously. Results are quali-
tatively similar when Moody’s 200 industry codes are used directly (not
shown in tables). Focusing on table 6.8, the usual base case, which involves
a 5 percent loan-to-one-industry limit, is reported in the last row. Raising
the limit to 10 percent increases the loss rate at the 99th percentile by
about seven percent, from 2.75 to 2.95 percent. Imposing no limit at all
raises the rate at the 99th percentile modestly, to 3.11 percent. Table 6.9
displays similar eﬀects of variations in limits when the 20-industry classi-
ﬁcation scheme is used.
Variations in loan-to-one-industry limits have relatively modest eﬀects
because defaults in any given year in the Moody’sd a t at e n dt ob es p r e a d
across several diﬀerent industries, with the largest number of defaults in
each industry being around ten in any of my classiﬁcations. Even where a
tight limit screens some exposure out of a relatively high-default industry
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substantial numbers of non-U.S. obligors have appeared in the data only in recent years.
in a given year, there are enough defaults in the same year in other indus-
tries to make possible large losses if the lender happens to invest in the
wrong borrowers. Moreover, the resampling engine naturally tends to
spread exposure across a number of industries (so the results in tables 6.8
and 6.9 do not reﬂect loss rates if simulated portfolios were forced to in-
clude only loans to a single industry).
I believe the results imply that for the moment cross-industry correla-
tions can be safely ignored in formal capital regulation for straight loan
portfolios. Although supervisors and bank managers should be attentive
to concentrations of loans to ﬁrms in a single industry, at this time there
is little empirical basis for specifying precise loan-to-one-industry limits
in regulation. However, for structured products like credit derivatives or
subordinated tranches of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), consider-
ations of cross-industry diversiﬁcation probably are signiﬁcant. Moreover,
improvements in credit risk measurement may in the future provide an
ability to specify loan limits or trade-oﬀs among industries with conﬁ-
dence. Limits on country exposure may be measurable now, but data limi-
tations led me to forego attempting measurement in this paper.14
6.8 The Internal Rating Approach’s Linear Approximation
Might Be Good Enough for Loans
As was noted previously, the internal ratings approach to capital regula-
tion involves an assumption of linearity or perfect correlation across
diﬀerent permutations of key dimensions of credit risk. That is, capital
Table 6.9 Loss Rates for Diﬀerent Loan-to-One-Industry Limits,
20-Industry Classiﬁcation
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case, no limit 0.66 2.10 3.13 3.52 4.41
Base case, 30 percent limit 0.66 2.09 3.10 3.52 4.43
Base case, 20 percent limit 0.66 2.09 3.08 3.50 4.38
Base case, 10 percent limit 0.64 1.95 2.84 3.18 4.00
Base case, 7.5 percent limit 0.64 1.92 2.78 3.12 3.86
Note: Parameters are those of the base case, but the loan-to-one-industry limit is varied and
the Carey 20-industry classiﬁcation scheme is used in enforcing the limit rather than the
usual Carey 39-industry scheme.
218 Mark CareyFig. 6.2 Percentage error from linear capital speciﬁcation
Notes: Each bar represents the percentage deviation of approximated from directly measured
loss rates at the 99th percentile for a single exercise. Exercises diﬀer in the fraction of loans
in each grade. Results are shown for every possible permutation of grade mixes when frac-
tions in each grade are varied in 20 percent increments. The linear method used to approxi-
mate capital is one typical of many internal rating approaches.
would be computed for each asset or subportfolio according to its charac-
teristics, and such allocations would be summed to obtain a total portfolio
capital requirement. Gordy (2000b) shows that such a setup presumes that
the risk of assets in all buckets is driven by a single systematic risk factor
(e.g., that mixing grades in a portfolio yields no diversiﬁcation beneﬁts).
Evidence on the accuracy of the linear approximation is provided by
estimating loss rates at the 99th percentile for portfolios with various mix-
tures of loans across grades, both directly and using the linear approxima-
tion. Only the mix of grades is varied, with all other parameters ﬁxed at
base-case values. Fractions of portfolio dollars in each of the grades A or
better, Baa, Ba, and B are varied in 20 percent increments, producing ﬁfty-
six diﬀerent permutations (e.g., 100, 0, 0, 0; 80, 0, 0, 20; 80, 0, 20, 0; etc.).
The 99th percentile loss rate is estimated directly for each permutation.
The linear approximation is computed by multiplying the percentage in
each grade times the 99th percentile loss rate for a portfolio composed of
loans only in that grade.
Diﬀerences in direct and approximated capital requirements are ex-
pressed as a percentage of the direct estimates in ﬁgure 6.2 and in absolute
terms in ﬁgure 6.3, one bar per permutation. Permutations are sorted
along the horizontal axis according to the fraction of the portfolio in the
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though qualitatively similar, produced somewhat larger approximation errors that indicate
that the approximation would generally overstate capital requirements. This is symptomatic
of the diﬃculty of measuring diversiﬁcation eﬀects.
A grades, then the fractions Baa and Ba. For example, the permutation
with 80 percent of loans rated A or better and 20 percent rated B, the
fourth bar from the right, features an absolute error of about 0.6 percent-
age points of capital, with the approximated requirement of 1.4 percent
being about 30 percent below the directly estimated requirement of about
2 percent.
Both percentage and absolute errors generally grow with the fraction in
the A grades, and the approximation generally understates the directly
estimated requirement. The percentage error can be large, ranging up to
40 percent. However, the absolute errors are modest, almost always less
than 0.5 percentage point of capital.
On the whole, I view these results as supportive of the adequacy of the
linear approximation. The largest percentage errors arise for high-grade
portfolios, and capital requirements are particularly diﬃcult to estimate
for such portfolios. At a one-year horizon, defaults by borrowers in the
Aaa, Aa, and A grades are extremely rare, and their timing relative to the
business cycle is idiosyncratic across databases.15 Thus, the imprecision of
Fig. 6.3 Absolute error from linear capital speciﬁcation
Notes: Each bar represents the absolute deviation in percentage points of approximated from
directly measured loss rates at the 99th percentile for a single exercise. Exercises diﬀer in the
fraction of loans in each grade. Results are shown for every possible permutation of grade
mixes when fractions in each grade are varied in 20 percent increments. The linear method
used to approximate capital is one typical of many internal rating approaches.
220 Mark Carey16. Moody’s database treats distressed exchanges as defaults. Such exchanges diﬀer from
restructurings in that exchanges are usually coercive take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by the issuer,
whereas restructurings are negotiated.
directly estimated tail loss rates for such portfolios may be similar to that
of the linear approximation.
6.9 Some Factors to Consider in Parameterizing an
Internal-Ratings-Based Regulatory Regime
Several factors that may not be obvious must be taken into account in
the parameterization of a credit risk model or regulatory capital regime.
Some such factors may appear to be mostly of interest to technicians, but
policy decisions that inﬂuence their handling can have a large eﬀect on
estimated economic capital allocations and thus regulatory requirements.
6.9.1 The Deﬁnition of Default Is Important
One such matter is the deﬁnition of default to use in estimating and
accounting for credit losses. The niceties of the deﬁnition are less impor-
tant in mark-to-market models, but the banking industry’s strong past
preference for historical cost measures may make the adoption of mark-
to-market approaches politically infeasible. If that is the case, the set of
credit risk events to be counted as loss-causing events and against which
regulatory capital is required is material (and must be reasonably stan-
dardized across banks). Most would agree that the payment defaults that
are recorded in the Moody’s database should be included as loss events.
Uncommon in the bond market and thus not in Moody’s database are
distressed restructurings, in which the payment terms of the original debt
contract are altered in negotiations between borrower and lender.16 Al-
though LGDs for restructurings are smaller on average than those for de-
faults, restructurings frequently impose losses on banks, which agree to
them because the alternative may be bankruptcy and its associated costs.
Evidence in Society of Actuaries (1998) shows that restructurings are com-
mon in private debt markets and represent a signiﬁcant share of lenders’
total credit losses over time: 127 of 566 credit risk events in that study were
restructurings, with a 21 percent mean LGD versus a 45 percent mean
LGD for defaults.
I simulate the eﬀect of including restructurings in the deﬁnition of de-
fault by randomly creating restructuring events in the Moody’sd a t af o r
otherwise nondefaulting experience records. Two exercises are conducted.
In the ﬁrst case, approximately one restructuring is created for every three
defaults in each year and grade of the base data. In the second case, the
restructuring rate is still proportional to defaults by year and grade, but
the rate is twice as high for below-investment-grade borrowers as for
investment-grade borrowers, resulting in the creation of approximately one
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18. The eﬀect on loss rates is more modest than if similar numbers of defaults were added
to the data because LGDs for restructurings are smaller.
restructuring for every two defaults. Severities for the restructurings are
simulated to conform to the distribution of restructuring severities in Soci-
ety of Actuaries (1998), whereas those for defaults conform to the distribu-
tion for defaults in that study.17
Results for the two exercises appear in table 6.10. Unsurprisingly, in-
cluding restructurings raises both mean and tail loss rates, with propor-
tional changes being in the 10 to 25 percent range and larger for the second
exercise than for the ﬁrst. Although the impact of including restructurings
in the deﬁnition of default is modest relative to the impact of ratings on
the bad tail, the eﬀects are economically signiﬁcant. Thus, regulators and
bankers should be attentive to the deﬁnition of default in setting up their
systems.18
6.9.2 That LGDs Vary Across Defaults Is Material
A common assumption in credit risk modeling is that expected LGDs
for individual defaults can safely be set to the average value of such LGDs
for assets of similar seniority. An appeal is made to the law of large num-
bers: Although individual-asset LGDs vary widely, annual defaults for any
large-bank portfolio are likely to number in the tens or hundreds, and thus
for defaults as a whole the LGD will collapse to a value near the popula-
tion mean. The ﬂaw in this argument is that real portfolios are not com-
Table 6.10 Loss Rates When Restructurings as Well as Defaults are Included
as Losses
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution
Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base case 0.63 1.87 2.71 3.04 3.87
One simulated restructuring for every three
defaults 0.75 2.10 2.98 3.32 4.16
One simulated restructuring for every two
defaults, higher rate for junk loans 0.80 2.24 3.18 3.53 4.37
Notes: Results in the ﬁrst row are those for the base case, in which only actual defaults as
recorded in Moody’s database are considered to be credit risk events. In the second and
third rows, exposures are randomly designated as restructurings as described in the text. All
simulated loans are senior, and simulated LGDs vary across loans such that their distribu-
tions mimic those reported in Society of Actuaries (1998) for defaults and restructurings
(mean LGDs of 44 and 22 percent, respectively; see section 6.5).
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the largest 50 or 100 loans usually account for a signiﬁcant fraction of to-
taldollarexposure.Ifafewoftheselargeloansdefault(aneventthatisusu-
allyassociated with a portfolio loss rate far out in the bad tail), the idiosyn-
cratic variation in realized LGDs for those few assets can have a material
eﬀect on the portfolio loss rate.
Table 6.11 demonstrates the importance of the ﬁxed versus variable
LGD assumption. The ﬁrst row reﬂects base-case parameters except that
simulated restructurings are included, as was described in section 6.9.1.
As was noted previously, simulated LGDs vary across defaults in a manner
similar to the distributions in Society of Actuaries (1998). In the second
row, LGDs are ﬁxed at the sample average rates for each type of credit
event (44 percent for defaults and 22 percent for restructurings). Although
the ﬁxed-LGD assumption has little eﬀect at the 95th percentile, it materi-
ally reduces the estimated loss rate at the 99.9th percentile by about 15
percent. Thus, in parameterizing an internal ratings based capital regula-
tory regime, if the projected bank failure rate that regulators are willing to
tolerate is quite low (corresponding to a percentile very far out in the bad
tail), it will be important to take idiosyncratic variation of LGDs into ac-
count.
6.9.3 Bad Years Strongly Inﬂuence the Tail Loss Rates
It is conventional in credit risk modeling to express the rate of bad tail
events in terms of the likelihood of such events implicit in an average year,
that is, as though such events might occur at any time. Although bad-tail
events are indeed possible at any time, intuition suggests that they are far
more likely to occur during times of general economic distress. Estimating
portfolio loss distributions by equally weighting events in each database
Table 6.11 Eﬀect of Fixed versus Variable LGDs
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Restructurings included, realistic LGD
variation 0.80 2.23 3.15 3.51 4.29
Restructurings included, ﬁxed LGDs
(mean values of the realistic
distributions) 0.81 2.16 2.91 3.17 3.74
Notes: Results are for an exercise in which simulated restructurings are created, similar to
the case reported in the third row of table 6.10. In the ﬁrst row, LGDs vary across credit risk
events by event type in such a manner that the distributions of LGDs mimic those reported
in Society of Actuaries (1998). In the second row, LGDs for all credit events are held ﬁxed at
the mean values for defaults and restructurings, respectively (all simulated loans are senior).
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rates. In choosing a level of capital requirements, policy makers must de-
cide whether they wish their chosen level of soundness to apply for the
average year or for bad years in particular. This section provides a sense
of the diﬀerence in bad-tail loss rates (and thus capital requirements) asso-
ciated with such a decision by comparing tail rates when all experience
years in the Moody’s database are used in simulations with rates when
only good years or bad years are used. Bad years include the ﬁve years of
highest overall average default rates in the data, which are 1970, 1986,
1989, 1990, and 1991, whereas good years are all others during the pe-
riod 1970–98.
The ﬁrst three rows of table 6.12 show loss rates for the usual base-case
distribution of loans across grades when all years are equally weighted in
the simulations and when only good years versus only bad years are used.
Both mean and tail loss rates are sharply higher in the bad years than in
the good years. The patterns imply that to achieve loss protection at the
99th percentile, capital ratios in the bad years must be about 175 percent
of those needed in the good years, and about 130 percent of those esti-
Table 6.12 Tail Loss Rates Based on All years, Good Years, and Bad Years
Simulated Loss Rates (percent)
At Loss Distribution Percentiles
Variant Mean 95 99 99.5 99.9
Base distribution of grades,
all years 0.62 1.86 2.72 3.09 3.86
Base distribution of grades,
good years only 0.47 1.36 2.04 2.34 3.07
Base distribution of grades,
bad years only 1.39 2.74 3.54 3.89 4.64
Investment-grade loans only,
good years only 0.02 0.15 0.52 0.74 1.29
Investment-grade loans only,
bad years only 0.12 0.64 1.25 1.51 2.27
Junk-grade loans only,
good years only 0.93 2.26 3.06 3.39 4.18
Junk-grade loans only,
bad years only 2.55 4.50 5.58 5.97 6.82
Notes: This table reports results when the normal equal-weighting of experience years in the
Moody’s database is varied to put all weight on good or bad years, respectively, with bad-
experience years being 1970, 1986, and 1989–91 and good years being all others during the
period 1970–98. Results in the ﬁrst row are for the base case and are for comparison. The
second and third rows restrict resampling to good and bad experience years, respectively,
while maintaining the usual distribution of loans across grades in simulated portfolios. Re-
maining rows report results for good versus bad years when all loans are restricted to be in
the grades Aaa through Baa3 (investment grade) or Ba1 through B3 (junk), respectively.
224 Mark Carey19. For the former, 40 percent of loans are rated A or better and 60 percent Baa, whereas
for the junk exercises 70 percent are rated Ba and 30 percent B.
mated to be required when all years are equally weighted. Seen another
way, a policymaker choosing to require capital to protect at the 99th per-
centile estimated with all years equally weighted, and thus requiring about
a 2.7 percent equity capital ratio for the typical large bank, would in bad
years be likely to experience a large bank failure rate of about 5 in 100,
whereas in good years the failure rate would be far less than 1 in 100, more
like 1 or 2 in 1000.
The remaining four rows of table 6.12 display good-year versus bad-
year loss rates for portfolios composed of purely investment-grade loans
versus those composed only of below-investment-grade loans.19 Tail loss
rates are sharply higher in the bad years than in the good for both types
of portfolios, but the eﬀect is somewhat more pronounced in the case of
the investment-grade portfolio. This is a bit of a surprise, as Carey (1998)
found that investment-grade, private-debt portfolio bad-tail loss rates were
rather insensitive to good-year versus bad-year distinctions. The diﬀerence
arises because two of the three defaults of issuers rated A or better ap-
pearing in the Moody’s data happened to occur in 1989 (a bad year gener-
ally), and Baa defaults were unusually high in 1986. In the Society of Actu-
aries data, investment-grade defaults tend to occur during relatively good
years. This diﬀerence in results points to the diﬃculty of reliably parame-
terizing credit risk models for the investment grades. For investment-grade
borrowers, defaults are small in number and their patterns are somewhat
idiosyncratic to particular databases.
6.10 Concluding Remarks
The evidence presented in this paper implies that diﬀerences across
assets in ratings and seniority (expected LGDs) and diﬀerences in granu-
larity across portfolios are important inﬂuences on diﬀerences in portfolio
credit risk. Bank capital regulations should take proper account of such
diﬀerences or risk a continuation of large-scale capital arbitrage. Impor-
tant but not widely understood considerations in determining the level of
regulatory capital requirements are the deﬁnition of loss-causing credit
risk events, the variability of LGDs across such events, and the extent to
which regulators wish to limit failure rates in bad years or in a hypothetical
average year.
On the whole, the results imply that for the commercial loan portfolios
of large U.S. banks, the internal ratings approach now under consideration
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision could adequately approx-
imate the capital allocations likely to be produced by a full models ap-
proach. However, a number of caveats apply:
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in the internal ratings approach may be needed for structured-ﬁnance
exposures such as credit derivatives.
● The credit risk properties of consumer loans, non-U.S. commercial
loans, and other types of exposures may diﬀer from those displayed
in this paper.
● The data in this paper represent a mixture of loan and bond loss
experience, but there is evidence that loan and bond experiences diﬀer
(Society of Actuaries 1998; Altman and Suggitt 2000).
● The results in this paper are most representative of the risks associ-
ated with a well-managed bank or portfolio. A poorly managed insti-
tution, especially one unable to provide reliable ratings of individual
assets or other risk-relevant information, may pose bad-tail risks
many times larger than those presented here.
● Regulatory capital must account for risks other than credit, such as
operational risks.
● The remaining maturity of an asset may be an important determinant
of its contribution to portfolio credit risk. However, maturity eﬀects
are intimately related to the time horizon of analysis and the choice
between mark-to-market and default-mode analysis. Research on
these matters is needed.
● Regulatory choices concerning the deﬁnition of capital and the sound-
ness standard to be used will have material eﬀects on the safety and
soundness achieved by any new regulation.
● Empirical ﬁndings of this and other papers are based on limited pan-
els of data. Allowance should be made for the possibility of economic
times that are worse than those reﬂected in available data.
Many other considerations are also important to the design of an appro-
priate regulatory capital standard.
I have taken as given in this paper the desirability of prudential regula-
tion and also the necessity of supervision that is adequate to ensure that
such regulations are implemented properly. However, even in the absence
of capital regulation, the results in this paper are useful to bank examiners,
bank investors, risk managers, and asset-backed security designers. All
such individuals must evaluate the credit risk embedded in debt portfolios
and thus are aided by an understanding of the factors that inﬂuence port-
folio credit risk.
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Comment Patricia Jackson
The paper is an extension of Carey’s earlier work on the development of
nonparametric estimates of the value at risk (VaR) of credit portfolios,
using resampling techniques to enable large numbers of portfolios to be
generated. For some rating bands, Carey replicates the obligors in his
sample to give a pool that is large enough for the resampling. One issue is
whether this increases the correlations aﬀecting the VaR estimates. The
development of nonparametric methods of estimating credit risk, however,
is an interesting way forward given the concerns about the assumptions
lying behind some of the parametric models.
Carey looks at the policy implications of the credit risk results, particu-
larly in relation to the development of the new Basel Accord. Under cur-
rent proposals, one approach for the setting of capital requirements for
credit books will be the banks’ internal ratings. It is proposed that banks
will be able to slot credit exposures into default probability bands for
which capital requirements will be set by the Basel Committee at least to
cover unexpected loss. These requirements will be calibrated against es-
timates of unexpected loss at a particular conﬁdence interval.
In this regard, Carey’s work raises a number of policy issues. One is
whether capital should cover just defaults or economic loss (i.e., a deterio-
ration in credit quality in a bank’s book as well as defaults). Carey uses
defaults, whereas the research being carried out at the Bank of England
looks at economic loss. The diﬀerence between the two is signiﬁcant. Cal-
culations by Bank of England staﬀ indicate that moving from default mode
to economic loss increases the VaR estimates by around 70 percent, al-
though less for the lower quality. Economic loss must be important. In any
year a bank must be able to withstand the defaults in that year as well as
overall weakness in the book that could lead to losses in later years.
This question is also related to the time horizon chosen. Carey calculates
losses on the portfolios over one-year periods. That is also the horizon
used in the Bank of England work and by many other banks. However, a
one-year horizon with default mode, rather than economic loss, implicitly
assumes that a bank will be able to raise new capital at the end of the year
228 Mark Careyto cover losses in later years. In fact, it would be very diﬃcult for a bank
to raise new capital in a severe economic downturn. It also implicitly as-
sumes that a bank will experience only defaults—that is, it will not have
any other loans that have deteriorated to such an extent that speciﬁc provi-
sions (i.e., reserves) have to be held against them (these are deducted from
capital). Default mode is therefore inconsistent with a one-year horizon.
Another issue is whether capital should cover expected as well as unex-
pected loss. Carey is looking at unexpected plus expected, and the Bank
of England research has been looking at unexpected, in line with the way
that banks look at their economic capital. This must depend on provi-
sioning and the capital treatment of provisions. Many banks do not pro-
vide against expected loss; and where they do, these general provisions are
included in Tier 2 capital. Probably it is right, therefore, to set capital
requirements against expected as well as unexpected loss or at least require
provisions (deducted from capital) against expected loss.
The loss given default assumptions are critical in calculating the VaRs
for credit books. These are assumptions about both the level of loss given
default and its volatility. The lower-grade credits are particularly sensitive
to the recovery rate assumptions. Overall, too little is known about loss
given default to be sure which assumptions should be used. In particular,
it is not clear which assumptions should be made about mean loss given
default and correlations in loss given default when default rates are high.
It may well be the case that in extreme recessions, loss given default is
generally high. The assumption made in the Bank of England research is
that recoveries average 50 percent with a standard deviation of 25 percent,
which is in line with the CreditMetrics manual. Carey, in his base-case
numbers, assigns loss given default to the exposures in his portfolio by
simulating the Society of Actuaries’ loss given default distribution pro-
duced for private debt. This has a mean of 36 percent, but it is not clear
what the standard deviation is.
The diﬀerent assumptions on default/economic loss and loss given de-
fault and its variability have a sizeable eﬀect on the value at risk estimates.
Kiesel, Perraudin, and Taylor (1999), using the same approach set out in
their paper “The Structure of Credit Risk,” calculate the VaR (with a 99.9
percent conﬁdence level) for a portfolio with the same quality distribution
as Carey, but they allow for economic loss. Their portfolio consists of 500
equally sized exposures. They also use the loss given default assumptions
from the CreditMetrics manual set out previously. They estimate a VaR of
7.5 percent against Carey’s 3.3 percent.
Carey suggests that maturity is also an important dimension for VaR
for credit books; we have also found this in the Bank of England research
(see Jackson and Perraudin 1999). The maturity eﬀect is greater for high-
quality portfolios. The policy issue for regulators is whether including this
dimension in capital requirements would lead to regulatory arbitrage.
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short-term? Would this matter if they could reprice the credit risk?
Carey mentions some other important issues as well. One is concentra-
tion. From the Bank of England work on credit portfolios, highly concen-
trated portfolios do seem far riskier than less concentrated portfolios. This
probably does need to be taken into account in the capital requirements.
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Discussion Summary
Doug Diamond began the general discussion with two questions. He noted
that given the one-year horizon, banks eﬀectively rebalance their portfo-
lios and are able to recapitalize. He observed that, in practice, banks have
some durable relationships and cannot fully rebalance at year-end. He also
asked about the risk of bank versus bond portfolios. In good times, he
noted, loans may be less risky because of priority, but in bad times loans
will be riskier than bonds because they are more illiquid.
Robert Eisenbeis followed, asking how representative the loss given de-
fault experience of bonds is for the loss given default of bank loans. He
raised a second issue, noting the importance of maturity on default proba-
bility. Citing work by Altman, he noted that the default experience of
bonds within a given rating class diﬀered by how long the bonds had been
outstanding. Bonds tended to have low default incidence in the ﬁrst couple
of years and then to increase signiﬁcantly.
Mark Flannery noted that Altman compares the recovery of bank loans
a n db o n d s .H ef o l l o w e du po nD o u gD i a m o n d ’s question and noted that
the distinction highlighted by the discussant (Patricia Jackson) between
mark-to-market losses and losses from default may be semantic. He ob-
served that the key question is whether a bank can raise capital at the end
of the year. He noted that the mark-to-market approach advocated by the
discussant recognizes the present value of all future losses, whereas the
default-mode approach assumes recapitalization.
Taking the discussion in another direction, James Wilcox noted the
challenge from an approach that leads to procyclical regulatory capital
230 Mark Careyrequirements and the diﬃculty of requiring banks to raise capital in bad
years.
Andrew Powell noted that an Argentine database of all loans is available
for research. He observed that using parametric approaches, in contrast
to the paper’s nonparametric approach, shows that estimated transition
matrices might be bank speciﬁc for this data set.
Martin Feldstein followed with two comments, ﬁrst noting that within a
year, banks will make portfolio adjustments to shed risk so the required
capital may be overstated. He also remarked on the importance of credit
derivatives. Looking forward, he noted that credit derivatives will be in-
creasingly important as banks originate and sell risk into the market and
that this raises the challenge of counterparty credit risk. He wondered how
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was addressing this issue.
Stephen Cecchetti wondered whether the Basel Accord was becoming
overly detailed and urged caution. He asked, if supervisors manage the
banking system, do we want all banks responding to shocks in the same
way? He noted that this might create systemic risk.
Mark Carey began by responding to Stephen Cecchetti, sharing his
worry about the accord’s becoming overly detailed, but not for herding
reasons. He noted that approximating credit risk and capital needs should
not do too much harm if the approximation is reasonably good. If the
approximation is bad, however, there will be a problem, particularly if
banks that are not well managed base their lending decisions on the regu-
latory capital rules. In response to Martin Feldstein, he agreed that credit
derivatives would need to be addressed, noting that this will be easier for
single name protection. He observed that if one does not understand port-
folio risk, then addressing credit derivatives would be less useful—the key
is to understand the dynamics of the underlying assets. He also agreed that
the bank-speciﬁc transition matrices brought up by Andrew Powell might
be important.
More generally on the question of using a one-year horizon and either
a mark-to-market or default-mode approach only, Carey noted that if bad
events are serially correlated, then the default-mode assumption that
bankscanrecapitalizewillbefalseandalongerhorizonwouldbeappropri-
ate—the question becomes how long a horizon. He asked whether spread
risk should be addressed if a mark-to-market approach is employed.
He also asked whether this is correct under a hold-to-maturity environ-
ment; that is, should a bank cover liquidity risk? He noted that banks
are currently wed to historical cost accounting and that a transition to a
framework that depends on mark-to-market accounting could be chal-
lenging.
In response to James Wilcox, he noted that even without procyclical
regulatory capital requirements, banks should be thinking about credit
risk in this portfolio framework. He pointed out that banks should raise
Credit Risk and Economic Capital Requirements 231capital and cut back on lending when the portfolio is riskier (a free-market
solution). He also noted that based on Altman’s work and other research,
there seems to be a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between bonds and bank loans,
both for default rates and recovery rates. Finally, he noted that because
rebalancing is not allowed within the year, the nonparametric default–only
approach employed assumes the portfolio is a one-year portfolio and that
the bank is recapitalized at the end of the year.
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